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Identity Management in the Age of 
Blockchain 3.0 
 
 
Abstract 
Since the invention of internet, Identity has become a 
significant aspect for nearly every interaction that 
occurs online. In this position paper, we demonstrate 
and discuss current limitations of centralised IdM 
systems by drawing from the cases of two of world’s 
largest biometric ID systems: India’s Unique 
Identification System Aadhar and China’s Social Credit 
system Sesame Credit. This paper explores self-
sovereign identity through innovative application from 
blockchain 3.0. We then identify some key 
characteristics of blockchain technologies to address 
the challenges centralised IdM services face and 
present opportunities for furthering HCI research 
around de-centralised IdM services to provoke 
workshop discussion.  
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 Introduction 
IdM is a ‘security discipline that enables the right 
individuals to access the right resources at the right 
times for the right reasons’ [27]. Traditional IdM 
systems such as passports or driving licences are 
disconnected, expensive, cumbersome, time consuming 
to process, and trustless as the documents can be 
easily forged. These established ways of verifying one’s 
identity are hindering digital innovation and limiting 
citizen experience. On the other hand, online IdM 
services, such as Facebook operate a federated identity 
system which can authenticate users’ identity across 
services to determine whether or not they're allowed 
access. In comparison, online IdM systems are fast and 
cheap; yet they have also failed to evolve from the 
standard web forms that have been used to 
authenticate users’ identity online over more than two 
decades! Further, it is relatively easy to fraudulently fill 
out an online form pretending to someone else. In the 
digital age, most online services do not provide 
Knowledge-Based Authentication that allows the user to 
prove his or her identity by providing shared security 
information to access the service.  
Limitations and Failures: Centralised IdM 
Services:   
In the recent years, we have seen the magnitude of 
personal identity leaks from organisations such as 
Equifax [17], Ebay [4], Yahoo [1] and Uber [4]. Such 
data leaks compromised millions of consumers’ digital 
identities. Identity data leaks are particularly worrisome 
when they involve sensitive or financial data e.g. credit 
card details or, credit scores, date of birth etc. These 
centralised models of IdM services thus pose particular 
risks and threats – to both the company/organisation in 
the form of reputational and prospectively financial 
damage and increased mistrust in its service; and to 
citizen-consumers in compromising their sensitive data. 
Unique Identification System (UIS) in India  
In 2009, the Government of India introduced Aadhar 
(‘foundation’ in Hindi) as a voluntary identification 
system that provides all Indian residents with their own 
unique 12-digit number. As of 30th November 2017, 
Aadhaar is the world's largest biometric ID system with 
more than 1.19 billion enrolled members [24]. When 
residents register for Aadhar, their biometric details in 
the form of finger prints (see Figure 1), iris scan and 
personal photograph are obtained, along with 
demographical details such as date of birth and proof of 
address, which are verified through existing IdM e.g. 
passport and birth certificate [9].  
Aadhar is an irreversible centralised identity system. It 
combines the details of a resident’s passport, mobile 
number, bank account, PAN card (Permanente Account 
Number) and driving licence in an open-access 
database to which access can be acquired via a 
commercial service. At the time of writing (Jan 2018) 
Aadhar is said to soon become the all-purpose 
identification tool [24]. 
Since it was introduced in 2009, being enrolled with 
Aadhar has increasingly become necessary – or 
compulsory for all practical purposes. For example, 
without Aadhar a student cannot sit for a national 
exam; and any new mobile sim card requires Aadhar 
verification for its activation. Even the deceased 
required Aadhar to enable the release of a death 
certificate. And in the burgeoning space of Indian online 
dating – some websites including Lovevivah and 
TrulyMadly use Aadhar as mandatory, to verify users’ is 
 
Figure 1: In this image, 
users’ finger print is taken to 
verify their identity against 
their Aadhar biometric 
details. Aadhar details are 
also linked to their mobile 
number for re-verification. 
Image credit India TV News.  
 now ubiquitous in India [23] and often impacts on the 
lives of Indians living abroad. This is all part of a higher 
level [5] which aims to make government services 
available electronically. 
However, there are many disadvantages in such 
centralised identity database systems. First, users’ 
identity information is insecure. Because of the poor 
data protection legislation and associated practice, 
personal data is often sold (outsourced) by companies 
and organisations for a small fee [14]. Second, the 
scale of such centralised identity databases could 
provide a tool for mass surveillance. Further, a 
significant drawback of incorporating biometric data is 
that this is non-salvageable – compromised once and it 
is compromised forever. Ahmad et al. [18] argues that 
biometric database links the information to the user, it 
cannot be reset or reproduced like unlike password 
when compromised. The 12 digit Aadhar identification 
number may link a user’s bank details and mobile 
numbers—exposing a history of bank transactions, 
spending patterns,  call history etc. Other information 
that can be relatively easily retrieved include a person’s 
tax details or any recorded traffic violations or other 
legal transgressions— accessed with a query and 
payment of a small fee [22].  
Social Credit System in China  
The Social Credit System (SCS) Sesame Credit was 
piloted by the Chinese government from 2015 as an 
initiative for developing what amounts to a national 
reputation system. Eight technology companies have 
been granted permission to develop their own private 
credit scoring platforms one of which was launched by 
the Alibaba Group (www.alibabagroup.com). The SCS 
concerns 5 aspects of one’s identity: users’ online credit 
history, personal information, online social networks, 
behavioural habits and ability to pay off debts. The 
Chinese government aims to register all Chinese 
nationals by 2020 in a social ranking database. Using 
their app, the company ranks users by judging the type 
of products they buy online and their associated 
behaviour and the users are scored in a range between 
300 and 850 (see Figure 2) by taking in account the 
above 5 aspects [13]. However, it is unclear if all 7 
technology companies follow the same SCS process to 
provide the social credit scores for its users.  
Sesame Credit connects users’ financial, social, 
political, and legal credit ratings to synthesise into a 
personalised ‘social trust score’. Individuals are ranked 
according to their social media interactions and online 
shopping history. Equally the score is informed on a 
wider variety of factors –whether they have received a 
ticket for a traffic offence or if they have unpaid taxes. 
In September 2016, the Chinese government legislated 
that users with high scores are now trusted to e.g. rent 
a car or a hotel room without paying a deposit; and 
even to move up the hospital waiting list for quicker 
treatment. Meanwhile those with lower scores are 
penalised as ineligible for public office or even social 
welfare payments; and no longer able to admit their 
child to a good school. The SCS appears to speak to the 
Chinese government’s motivation around harvesting 
personal data on a large enough scale that it becomes 
a ‘big data’ resource for potential social control. As a 
means of mass surveillance it can privilege those who 
have earned higher ‘scores’ – thus promoting its 
particular values and channelling its limited resources 
to those who live by its rules. Some claim that the 
system replaces what in the west is verified by a simple 
credit card in what is still a cash based economy; and 
 
Figure 2: Alibaba's Sesame 
Credit interface showing how 
users are assigned numerical 
ratings based on various of 
financial factors (behaviour, 
characteristics, performance, 
history, connections). Image 
credit Nikkei Asian Review 
 
 
 that such a system is necessary for promoting trust 
between citizens. However, the Chinese companies 
tasked with running the SCS do not real their ‘complex 
algorithms’ that inform an individual’s rating making it 
very difficult if impossible to repair a lower score. 
As with Aadhar, Sesame Credit is being used in Chinese 
matchmaking, in a service called Baihe (Baihe.com) to 
promote its clients who have with good credit scores by 
giving them prominent spots on the company's website. 
And as with Aadhar, Sesame Credit was introduced to 
Chinese citizens as voluntary but has since become –in 
a practical sense – mandatory. In both these cases the 
services have effectively become compulsory by stealth 
without adequate investigation of the socio-technical 
and wider consequences. 
Trust(less) services  
Trust in centralised IdM services is uni-directional. 
Pasquale [21] refers to a ‘one-way mirror’ in his book 
‘The Black Box Society’ where users are required to 
have trust in a serv  ice, and to share their data. These 
services have no obligation or need to trust in their 
users; this is provided by evidence. Such centralised 
IdM systems can be thus be disruptive to users’ 
welfare, and any lapse in the service’s security poses 
multiple risks and threats.  
Such centralised systems are of particular threat to 
‘vulnerable’ groups, including women in a patriarchal 
Indian society. For instance, it is common for 
uneducated woman in India to lack valid personal 
documentation. Further for any woman her Aadhar 
must be first validated either by her husband or her 
father, while a child’s Aadhar is linked to their father’s 
as opposed to their mother’s. China’s SCS makes it 
very difficult for the users to restore their scores 
especially if they do not know how the algorithm works. 
Such centralised systems polarises those at the either 
end of the spectrum.  
Blockchain and IdM 
Crosby et al. [7] offer a simple definition of blockchain 
as a 1.0 is currency, deployed as cryptocurrencies such 
as Bitcoin, Ripple and Ethereum; blockchain 2.0 is 
contracts which represents financial applications as 
smart contracts and finally; blockchain 3.0 is the 
application of blockchain beyond the financial domain to 
e.g.  civic systems, health, identity management, art 
and so on (refer Elsden et al. 2018 spreadsheet). The 
distributed trust model is a new way of managing 
identities and to establish trust among users, identity 
providers and relaying parties. While Nakamoto’s 
blockchain (as blockchain 1.0) has been repurposed, 
across financial services, infrastructure, governance, 
identity management and much more, blockchain 2.0 
technologies have the potential to empowers citizens 
and consumers to control their own identity and share 
between trusted entities with their full consent. 
According to Underwood [26] blockchain driven IdM 
services have the potential to change lives by providing 
‘unparalleled transparency’ especially in developing 
countries to empowering people through ‘recognised 
identity, asset ownership and financial inclusion’.  
Dunphy and Petitcolas [11] have recently further 
classified blockchain based IdM into two main 
categories i. self-sovereign digital identities (e.g. 
Sovrin; Uport) and ii. Decentralised Trusted Identity  
 
 
"Someone who plays video 
games for 10 hours a day, for 
example, would be 
considered an idle person, 
and someone who frequently 
buys diapers would be 
considered as probably a 
parent, who on balance is 
more likely to have a sense of 
responsibility."  
Li Yingyun, Sesame's 
technology director told 
Caixin, a Chinese magazine, 
in February 2015. 
 
“If blockchain technology can 
be used to secure robust, 
self-sovereign digital 
identities around personal 
data, there's a real possibility 
that people in places with 
poor documents, registries 
and rules of law can establish 
trusted measures of their 
good reputation. This would 
allow them to assert who 
they are and access proof of 
their digital identity anywhere 
using a private key” 
Dahan, 2016 
 
  Website Description 
             Decentralised Trusted Identity 
ShO 
Card  
https://shocar
d.com/ 
 
Sho Card provides IdM services 
through multifactor 
authentication through 
blockchain. Users can securely 
log into online services and 
devices without user ID and 
password. 
ID202
0 
http://id2020.
org/ 
 
Seeks to provide every child 
born after 2020 with a self-
sovereign digital identity to 
reduce risks of human 
trafficking and to drive digital 
inclusion. 
Trust 
Stam
p 
https://trustst
amp.net/ 
Trust Stamp uses social media 
and other publicly available 
data to verify identity and 
provide a unique trust score. 
Details of an individual’s score 
are private and under their 
control; yet can easily be 
shared on another platform. 
Bitnati
on 
https://bitnati
on.co/ 
 
“The World’s First Virtual Nation 
– A Blockchain Jurisdiction.” A 
cryptographically secured public 
ledger distributed to all users 
that allows self-governance. 
e-
reside
ncy 
https://e-
resident.gov.e
e/ 
 
A digital nation for global 
citizens, built by the Republic of 
Estonia. Government issued 
digital IDs available to access 
Estonian services such as 
company formation, banking, 
payment processing, and 
taxation. 
 
 
 Website Description 
                     Self-Sovereign Digital Identities 
Sovrin 
https://sovrin.
org/ 
 
Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is 
an identity that is owned and 
controlled by an individual or 
organisation. No one else can 
read it, use it, turn it off, or 
take it away without its owner’s 
explicit consent.  
Blocks
tack 
https://blockst
ack.org/ 
 
An open source blockchain 
application providing digital 
keys to enable users to own 
their identity. Users can sign in 
to apps locally without remote 
servers or identity providers. 
Uport 
https://www.u
port.me/ 
 
The first identity system to 
enable self-sovereign identity, 
allowing the user to be in 
complete control of their 
identity and personal 
information.  
Spidc
hain 
www.spidchain
.com 
 
Spidchain uses blockchain to 
improve the digital identity 
management. The Blockchain 
allows the users high security 
level, with an easy and quick 
access, with significantly lower 
costs when compared with the 
current systems. 
 
Table 1: Based on the survey available at Elsden et al 
[12].  
 
 
 (e.g. ShoCard). With regard to the former applications 
such as Sovrin, Uport and Spidchain offer self- 
sovereign identity through blockchain technology where 
the owner has control over what information they share 
without ‘external administrative authority’ [11]. 
Decentralised trusted Identity applications offer 
centralised service that provide identity proofing 
through existing identifications like passport and driving 
licence. The above-mentioned applications are few of 
applications offer ‘privacy and trust’, where interactions 
and transactions are secure by allowing authentication 
and verification only by ‘consensus mechanism’ within 
the ‘permissioned network’.  
Building on Dunphy and Petitcolas [11] we set out and 
extend entries available in the Elsden et al. 2018 
database of blockchain applications as examples 
services offering IdM through secured with peer to peer 
interaction and storage of one’s personal information 
which enables one to create a new digital identity –
crucially allowing self-sovereign identity.  
 
Is Blockchain a solution 
Centralised online databases have proven time and 
again that people’s personal information is exposed and 
extremely vulnerable. Could blockchain be the solution 
for the centralised IdM failures? Blockchain-based 
applications propose that users’ personal information is 
safe, that the technology with proper application offers 
flexibility and better control over what information they 
share (e.g. revealing your age without having to show 
ones’ passport or drivers licence). Swan [25] argues 
that blockchain technology still has many issues that 
need to be addressed, before individuals feels 
comfortable sharing their personal information in a 
‘decentralised manner’. Yet even such decentralised 
technology enables self-sovereign identity –bringing 
more control to the individual over managing personal 
information, and lowers the risk of ‘joined up’ 
cumulative identity theft.  
Can online identity be self-sovereign? Can we securely 
manage our own personal data, sharing only what we 
want to share, so we do not have to put trust in other 
parties? We propose a potential solution which could 
combine of aspects of the decentralised technology/ 
transaction and centralised governance. This could be a 
flexible user-centric identity approach aiming to provide 
user-friendliness of authentication procedures, while at 
the same time ensuring strong authentication to service 
providers. As governments play a significant role in 
enabling and regulating the new digital identity 
ecosystem. While there are several unknowns about 
blockchain technology, we advocate for future research 
to address technical and privacy challenges for personal 
records. Buttarelli [6] argues that it is important that 
technologists and designers have to work closely to 
implement data protection law so the users share 
minimal information, contrary to the current practice 
where private companies and governments collect large 
amount of data sets and store them indefinitely. EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (www.eugdpr.org/), 
which includes the ‘right to be forgotten’, are difficult to 
regulate and new technologies can have aspects 
deigned in functions to support online privacy and 
safety. It is necessary that we as researchers, 
technologists, designers and also users to study and 
understand how to maximise the benefits of this 
technology to attain better development outcomes. 
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